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The paper explores the role of human and non-human capital factors in determining 
the earnings of workers in Pakistan. The Labour Force Survey data 1993-94, which 
provides detailed information about workers, has been used for this analysis. Ordinary 
least squares estimation technique has been utilised for the analysis. The analysis is 
carried out separately for male and female workers. It is found that in human capital 
variables, education plays a dominant role in wage determination. In non-human capital 
factors, occupation and size of the establishments are found to be relevant variables. 
Other important variables include regional location and technical training. The sample 
selection bias has been observed for female workers whereas no problem has been 
observed for male workers, and the bias has been corrected by using the Heckman 
procedure, though both corrected and uncorrected results are reported. Important 
conclusions and policy implications are discussed at the end. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The distribution of individual earnings is an important issue from the 
standpoint of public policy. It becomes more important when earnings are skewed 
among individuals. What is the cause of disparity in earnings? Does it stem from the 
personal characteristics of individuals or is caused by the labour market 
characteristics? This and the related questions could easily be answered if the 
determinants of earnings are known. The focus of the present study is to determine 
the factors playing a significant role for personal earnings of the individuals. The 
identification of factors can help design policies not only to improve the economic 
and social conditions of the individuals but also the overall income distribution. 
Zafar Mueen Nasir is Senior Research Economist at the Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics, Islamabad.  
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A number of studies have estimated the earnings functions for Pakistan [ for 
example, see Hamdani (1977); Haque (1977); Guisinger et al. (1984); Khan and 
Irfan (1985); Ashraf and Ashraf (1993); Ahmad and Sirageldin (1994) and others]. 
But very few have focused on the determinants of personal earnings of the workers. 
Haque (1977) included socio-economic and human capital variables in the earnings 
function to explain the earnings differential. Based on Rawalpindi city data, the 
analysis showed that the human capital factors played a major role in determining 
individual earnings. It was observed that workers in the formal sector earned either 
the same income or slightly less than workers of the informal sector. Moreover, male 
workers earned more than their female counterparts. Shabbir (1994) estimated 
Mincerian earnings function by utilising the Population, Labour Force, and 
Migration (PLM) survey data, 1979. The study pointed out that the labour market 
was not homogeneous and workers in different segments of the labour market 
received different returns. 
Although these studies contribute significantly to understanding the 
determinants of personal earnings in Pakistan, they, however, suffer from several 
weaknesses. First, the study by Haque (1977) is confined to only one city which 
severely restricts its applicability to all Pakistan workers. The study by Shabbir 
(1994) is limited to male workers, thus ignoring female workers who play a 
significant role in the Pakistani labour market. Second, none of the studies discussed 
the issue of sample selection, which leads to bias estimates.1 
The present study uses the earnings function approach to examine the 
determinants of personal earnings of the wage and salaried workers. The paper uses 
human capital as well as socio-economic (non-human capital) factors to explain the 
earnings of individuals. The human capital variables are included in the model 
because of their positive association with the earnings established in Pakistan by 
earlier studies [Hamdani (1977); Haque (1977); Guisinger et al. (1984); Khan and 
Irfan (1985) and Shabbir (1994)]. An attempt is also made to account for the gender 
differences, because a large disparity exists in the earnings of these two groups 
[Ashraf and Ashraf (1993)]. Other factors such as the occupation and size of the 
establishment have also been included in the earnings functions because of the 
existence of labour market segmentation where the returns differ among workers 
[Khan and Irfan (1985); Shabbir and Khan (1991); Ashraf and Ashraf (1993); 
Shabbir (1994)]. Thus the present study intends to bridge the gap in literature by 
providing recent evidence on several aspects of the Pakistani labour market. It 
utilises nationally representative Labour Force Survey (1993-94), which provides 
1Other studies estimated earnings functions for different reasons. For example, Hamdani (1977); 
Guisinger et al. (1984) and Khan and Irfan (1985) used these functions to calculate the rate of return to 
education. Ashraf and Ashraf (1993) estimated earnings functions to calculate the male-female earnings 
gap. Because of their different objectives, these studies ignored many important variables which should 
have been included in the model. For example, Ashraf and Ashraf (1993) ignored occupations of the 
workers and size of the establishment. Most of the other studies mentioned above did not account for the 
distinction between formal and informal sector and employer size. 
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information on many characteristics of the Pakistani workers. The exclusion of non-
wage workers from the model can bias the results if the model is estimated by the 
ordinary least squares method. The study goes one step forward by providing 
estimates corrected for sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) procedure. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two explains the model and its 
estimation methodology. Section Three deals with the data and its characteristics. 
Section Four discusses the results. Major findings and policy implications are 
provided in the concluding section. 
 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
Following Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), we begin with a simple human 
capital earning function which indicates that the variation in earnings arises from 
difference in investment in human capital. As most studies have shown that 
experience-earnings profiles are usually concave, therefore the quadratic term is used 
to capture diminishing marginal returns to experience.2 The other adjustments made 
in the functional form of the earnings equation are described below. 
First, as different levels of education impart different skills and earnings, it would 
be inappropriate to treat schooling as homogenous.3 Thus five levels of education, i.e., 0–
4, 5–7, 8–9, 10–13,and degree education are included in the earnings function. 
Second, there is a possibility that distinct regional labour markets 
(urban/rural) may behave differently. In particular, because high-wage urban regions 
have greater opportunities for jobs and better prospects for higher earnings, therefore 
it is important to account for regional differences.4  
Third, the wage structure may differ because of the existence of segmented 
labour market (formal and informal sector). According to the conventional 
microeconomics theory, workers with similar educational levels and measured traits 
should receive the same wages in the long run. The view is contradicted by the 
theory of labour market segmentation, which predicts that even in the long run, 
workers with identical characteristics will not receive the same wage in different 
labour market segments. This view is supported by many studies, which found that 
the size of the establishment has a strong effect on wages even when one controls for 
personal wage and non-wage characteristics of the job.5 The monitoring models of 
2Age of the worker is taken as proxy for experience. It is necessary because of many reasons. 
First, education is available in levels instead of years completed.  The widely used procedure to calculate 
potential experience (age-schooling-6) suggested by Mincer is not possible to calculate due to this reason. 
Second, as Ashraf and Ashraf (1993) pointed out, the school-going age is not uniform in different parts of 
the country. Therefore, potential experience is not very useful in the case of Pakistan. Thus, age itself can 
be as good a proxy for experience as potential experience. 
3Evidence from previous research suggests different returns to different levels of education. See, 
for example, Haque (1977); Khan and Irfan (1985); Shabbir (1992) and Asharf and Ashraf (1993). 
4See Shabbir (1994) and Shabbir and Khan (1992). 
5Rebitzer and Robinson (1991) examine the effect of employer size on wages in different labour 
market segments. See Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988) for studies of industry 
wage differentials. 
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labour market segmentation and sociological theories of rent-sharing in the primary 
sector also support this view. Therefore, to control for the employer size, big and 
small establishment jobs are separated from the informal sector jobs.  
Fourth, because of the divide-and-rule strategies, one can expect firms to 
favour men over women. According to these models, employers treat one equally 
productive group of workers better than another by paying a lower wage and thus 
extract more effort from workers [Roemer (1979); Bowls (1985) and Gintis (1976)]. 
Furthermore, households assign proportionally larger number of non-work activities 
to women than men [Juster and Stafford (1991)]. This results in shorter tenures in 
market jobs and a strong desire for shorter working weeks. Because of these 
aggregate gender differences, the employers may restrict the access of women to 
low-paying jobs. Employers may also engage in statistical discrimination against 
women if, as a group, they have shorter expected tenure than male workers [Bulow 
and Summers (1986)]. It is, therefore, important to account for the gender 
differences.  
The general form of the equation representing all these variables is presented 
below. 
iiiiii uSOZXwln +β+β+β+β+β= 43210  … … … (1) 
In Equation 1, Xi  is vector of human capital variables consisting of 
educational categories, age and its square term, and job training. Zi is the vector of 
other characteristics such as dummies for regional location and gender groups. Oi is 
the vector of occupational categories and Si represents the size of the establishments. 
A complete list of the variables is provided in Table 1.  
Before we close this section, a few words regarding the estimation technique 
are in order. A model like the one presented in Equation 1, if estimated by the 
ordinary least squares estimation procedure, which excludes non-wage earners, 
hence truncating the sample, may introduce bias in estimates. As wage-related 
characteristics also affect labour market participation, it is important to include the 
non-wage earners in the model for unbiased estimates. A two-step procedure 
suggested by Heckman (1979), to estimate the wage and labour market participation 
equations, may reduce sample selection bias from the earnings estimates. In the first 
step of the Heckman procedure, the inverse of Mill’s ratio, a new regresser, is 
constructed by estimating a probit model for the probability that an individual is 
earning. In the second step, earnings are estimated by ordinary least squares using an 
additional regressor, the inverse of Mill’s ratio. Mathematically, the model can be 
outlined as: 
Let the earnings function be 
ii uXYi +β=  if Yi > 0  
    =   0 otherwise … … … … (2) 
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Table 1 
Description of the Variables Used in the Study 
Variables Description 
LW Log of monthly earnings of main job at current prices. 
AGE Current age of the individual. 
AGESQ Age Squared. 
LPRIM One if education less than primary including illiterates (zero otherwise). 
PRIM One if education is between five to seven years (zero otherwise). 
MID One if education is between eight to nine years (zero otherwise). 
MAT One if education is between ten to thirteen years (zero otherwise). 
DEG One if completed degree education (zero otherwise). 
PRO One if professional, Technical and related workers (zero otherwise). 
MANG One if Administrative and Managerial workers (zero otherwise). 
CLERC One if Clerical and related workers (zero otherwise). 
SALE One if Sales workers (zero otherwise). 
SERV One if Service workers (zero otherwise). 
PROD One if Production workers (zero otherwise). 
AGW One if the profession is agriculture (zero otherwise). 
SO One if workers of the Small Establishments (zero otherwise). 
BO One if workers of the Big Establishments (zero otherwise). 
SEX One if worker is Male (zero otherwise). 
UR One if worker lives in Urban areas (zero otherwise). 
WPART One if participate in the wage market (zero otherwise). 
TT One if completed technical training (zero otherwise). 
MSP One if married and lives with spouse (zero otherwise). 
WPART One if participate in the wage market (zero otherwise). 
DRATIO Dependency ratio = (HS-HE)/HS* 
*Here HE and HS stand for earners and total members of the household respectively. 
 
where Yi is individual earnings and Xi is a vector of all regressors. Because of the 
exclusion of non-wage earners from the sample, E (ui) ≠ 0, which violates the 
important assumption of the ordinary least squares estimation procedure. The 
inclusion of non-wage earners will modify the model, which becomes  
iiii XY ε+δλ+β=  … … … … … … (3) 
where E(εi)=0 and the new regressor λi is the inverse of Mill’s ratio. The inverse of 
Mill’s ratio is defined as: 




















 … … … … … … (4) 
where f is the density and F is the probability distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. Both functions are evaluated at δ
β iX . To overcome the 
estimation problem because of the λi , an unknown, Heckman suggested using a 
censoring indicator in the first step. For this purpose, a dependent dummy of wage 
participation Zi is considered. This variable includes both wage and non-wage 
earners. It is defined as 
Zi  =  1            if Yi   > 0   
    =   0  if Yi  ≤  0 … … … … … (5) 
Information on this variable is available. The probit model to be estimated by the 































ω=λ  … … … … … … (7) 
As λi , the inverse of Mill’s ratio can be derived in the first step, the estimation of 
Equation 4 in the second step, by OLS results in unbiased and consistent estimates.  
 
III.  DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
1993-94. It is a regular feature of the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) since July, 
1963. These data provides comprehensive information not only on the unemployed 
persons but also on many characteristics of employed persons. The information on 
earnings, age, education levels, sex, marital status, regions, employer size, 
occupation, and employment status is particularly important for this study. The 
… … … … (6) 
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unique aspect of the Labour Force Survey data is that it separates regular wage 
employees from casual paid workers, paid non-family apprentices, and those who are 
working at piece rate.6 This distinction enabled us to separate regular wage 
employees from irregular wage workers. The other useful information in the Labour 
Force Survey is about the place of work. This information helped us to separate the 
formal sector from the informal sector. Additionally, from the information given, we 
can distinguish small establishments from the big ones. Another feature of the data 
set is that it has detailed information about earnings. It separates cash payments from 
non-cash payments and the bonuses from regular salary. Moreover, this data set is 
used for the first time to estimate earnings functions.  
The other commonly used comparable data source is the Household Integrated 
Economic Survey (HIES). Although it provides information about many 
characteristics of individuals but lacks such details as the LFS provides. The Labour 
Force Survey is exclusively designed to explore the Pakistani labour market, whereas 
the HIES has its main focus on gathering information on income and expenditure of 
the household. Both data sets are compared in Table 2, which presents average 
monthly earnings of paid employees by education. This comparison is carried out for 
both sexes, and for males and females, separately. 
The comparison shows that except for degree-holders, workers in the LFS 
with different educational backgrounds receive much higher wages relative to the 
workers represented in the HIES. It is also noted that the HIES data represent a 
higher percentage of female workers having ten or less years of schooling (i.e., 76 
percent in the HIES as compared to 46 percent in the LFS). This is one of the 
reasons for lower female-male earnings ratio in the HIES relative to the LFS. To 
further explore the low female-male earnings ratio in the HIES as compared to the 
LFS, we disaggregated both data sets into formal and informal sectors of 
employment. This was done due to the fact that the earnings in the informal sector 
are lower than in the formal sector [Ghayur (1993)]. It is found that the 
representation of informal sector workers in the HIES is higher than in the LFS 
data, i.e., 59 percent in the HIES as compared to 53 percent in the LFS. 
Furthermore, it is found that a higher percentage of female workers in the HIES 
(65 percent) relative to the LFS (59 percent) work in the informal sector. The 
average earnings of these female workers are found to be Rs 928.92 and Rs 
1596.27 in the HIES and the LFS respectively. This may be another reason for 
lower female-male earnings ratio.  
The comparison of these two data sets leads us to believe that the earnings of 
workers in the HIES are understated relative to the LFS data. The analysis based on 
the HIES data may lead us to biased estimates, therefore we used the LFS data for 
this study. Some important details of the LFS are provided below. 
6The list of irregular workers included those who are paid when the service has been performed. 
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Table 2 
Average Monthly Earnings of Paid Employees, by Educational Level and Sex 
LFS 1993-94 HIES 1993-94 
Sex/Education  Both Sexes Males Females Both Sexes Males Females 
Below  Primary 1828.75 1858.12 1426.18 1486.90 1539.73 908.56 
Below Matric  2040.29 2045.86 1861.56 1813.89 1832.59 1158.71 
Matric 2570.65 2619.07 2041.53 2462.66 2513.43 1864.54 
Degree 3887.24 4054.96 2791.25 3901.42 4054.40 2515.33 
Professional Degree 5412.43 5486.01 4961.75 5142.96 5901.86 4625.33 
Total 2600.84 2613.81 2474.41 2058.76 2101.28 1518.99 
Sources: Labour Force Survey 1993-94 and Household Integrated Economic Survey 1993-94. 
 
The LFS data contains information about 20,400 households: including 9648 
(47 percent) urban and 10752 (53 percent) rural households. The sampling frame is 
drawn from the numeration block list as updated through the Census of 
Establishment conducted during 1988 and the list of villages/mouzas/dehs published 
by the Population Census Organisation as a result of the 1981 population census, 
from urban and rural domains respectively. Data has been collected by direct 
interview and the effects of seasonal variations are offset by enumeration on a 
monthly basis, distributed evenly over the whole year. 
The probit model is estimated using information on wage as well as non-wage 
earners. The earnings function, however, is estimated only for those individuals who 
are regular wage and salaried employees and have monthly earnings of Rs 100 or 
more in the wage sector from the main occupation. The unrealistic observations are 
deleted from the sample to avoid inconsistencies. The self-employed, piece rate 
workers and unpaid family workers are excluded from this reduced sample because 
they do not reflect the true picture of the wage market. The participation sample 
consists of 26134 individuals, with 24422 males and 1712 females. The earners’ 
sample includes 7117 workers, 6562 males and 555 females. Table 2 provides the 
means and standard deviations of workers by gender and for both sexes. According 
to that, the average monthly earnings of all workers are approximately Rs 2600 
whereas male workers, on average, earn Rs 2613 a month and female Rs 2447 per 
month. This means that female workers, on average, earn approximately 6 percent 
less than male workers. 
It is noted that the mean age of our sample is 34.45 years. The female 
workers, on average, are 3.16 years younger then the male workers. Moreover, 11 
percent females and 9 percent males in the sample have completed technical training. 
So far as formal education is concerned, a larger percentage of male workers are 
educated as compared to female workers. The occupational distribution is also 
different for both male and female workers. The male workers are mainly engaged in 
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production activity whereas women are concentrated in the profession classified as 
service. It is also noted that a higher percentage of females are professional workers. 
The distribution of workers in different industries indicates that the social sector 
employs the majority of both kinds of workers (48 percent males and 90 percent of 
females). It is further noted that a slightly higher percentage of female workers is 
employed in the informal sector relative to male workers, who are mainly employed 
in the formal sector. For further details, please see Table 3.    
 
Table 3 
Mean Characteristics of Wage Earners 
All Pakistan Males Females 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
MEARN 2600.84 (1814.22) 2613.81 (1807.25) 2447.41 (1889.56) 
AGE 34.46 (11.54) 34.70 (11.57) 31.51 (10.81) 
SEX 0.9200 (0.2682) – – – – 
MSP 0.7242 (0.4470) 0.7415 (0.4378) 0.5189 (0.5001) 
UR 0.7103 (0.4537) 0.6980 (0.4592) 0.8559 (0.3516) 
LPRIM 0.2737 (0.4458) 0.2767 (0.4474) 0.2378 (0.4261) 
PRIM 0.1075 (0.3098) 0.1131 (0.3167) 0.0414 (0.1995) 
MID 0.1014 (0.3019) 0.1067 (0.3087) 0.0396 (0.1953) 
MAT 0.3243 (0.4681) 0.3222 (0.4673) 0.3495 (0.4773) 
DEG 0.1931 (0.3947) 0.1814 (0.3853) 0.3315 (0.4712) 
PRO 0.0759 (0.2648) 0.0703 (0.2556) 0.1423 (0.3497) 
MANG 0.0521 (0.2223) 0.0544 (0.2268) 0.0252 (0.1570) 
CLERC 0.2168 (0.4121) 0.2306 (0.4212) 0.0541 (0.2263) 
SALE 0.0530 (0.2240) 0.0567 (0.2313) 0.0091 (0.0945) 
SERV 0.1433 (0.3504) 0.1375 (0.3444) 0.2126 (0.4095) 
AGRI 0.0526 (0.2232) 0.0536 (0.2253) 0.0396 (0.1953) 
PROD 0.2719 (0.4450) 0.2879 (0.4528) 0.0829 (0.2760) 
DRATIO 0.6804 (0.2026) 0.6889 (0.2002) 0.5803 (0.2041) 
BO 0.4991 (0.5000) 0.4976 (0.5000) 0.5171 (0.5002) 
SO 0.3478 (0.4763) 0.3525 (0.4778) 0.2919 (0.4550) 
INFOR 0.1531 (0.3600) 0.1499 (0.3569) 0.2922 (0.3932) 
Source: Labour Force Survey 1993-94. 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Before analysing regression results, it is useful to examine the pattern of 
earning of  different educational levels with age for male and female workers. Table 
4 presents average monthly earnings of male and female workers for different 
categories of education and age groups. The plots of Table 4 are presented in Figures 
1 and 2. Consistent with the human capital theory, these figures show a rise in 
earnings with higher levels of education. Moreover, the age earnings profiles for 
different education groups follow the usual concave shape, showing a decline in 
earnings after the prime earnings age. 
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Table 4 
Average Monthly Earnings by Age and Education Groups 
Education/Age 0–9 years 10–13 years 14 + years Total 
Male Workers 
10–20 Years 1304.59 1640.39 237.14 1498.55 
21–25 Years 1708.58 2005.20 2971.10 2085.99 
26–30 Years 1897.16 2256.35 3463.59 2396.80 
31–35 Years 1961.71 2294.66 4256.80 2794.38 
36–40 Years 2032.13 2601.68 5206.63 3024.89 
41–45 Years 2096.24 2729.69 5500.06 3543.90 
46–55 Years 2058.51 3130.36 6274.39 3226.55 
56+ Years 1865.17 3051.64 5764.63 2680.55 
  Total  1830.68 2338.20 4641.99 2613.81 
Female Workers 
10–20 Years 965.00 1624.66 2105.75 1497.24 
21–25 Years 1346.00 1928.58 2888.91 1835.69 
26–30 Years 1572.34 2083.96 3009.91 2334.57 
31–35 Years 1766.00 2181.00 3361.36 2465.97 
36–40 Years 1844.75 2346.67 3979.52 2906.66 
41–45 Years 1631.82 2616.67 4921.43 3293.53 
46+ Years 1343.61 2415.91 4651.58 2691.35 
  Total  1533.16 1996.77 3728.53 2447.41 
Source: Labour Force Survey 1993-94. 
 
The earnings profiles for male and female workers are compared in Figures 3, 4, 
5, and 6. These profiles depict some interesting facts. For example, in Figure 3, which 
compares the average of total monthly earnings, the profile of female workers start at 
the same level of earnings but remains below male workers’ profile, reaching the peak 
earlier than male workers and getting a sharp down-turn afterwards.7 As expected, 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the same pattern of profiles for different education levels. It is 
noted that the earnings are lower for female workers as compared to male workers for 
different educational and age categories.8 These findings suggest that the female 
workers are not treated as equal to male workers in the labour market and are given 
lower compensation as compared to their male counterparts. The presence of 
discrimination in the Pakistani labour market, as found by other studies, could be one 
of the reasons for these low earnings [Ashraf and Ashraf (1993)].9  
7When data were disaggregated into smaller age-groups, it was found that female workers reach the 
peak around 45 years of age whereas male workers reach their peak earnings around 46 years of age. 
8The difference in earnings by gender is higher with higher level of education (i.e., 14 and above). 
This may be due to the lower number of observations in this educational category with different age 
groups for female workers. 
9One can further explore the role of female workers relative to their household responsibilities 
where they act as secondary earner and their employment decision is linked with the earnings of male 
workers. The relative importance of their income declines when the earnings of male workers in the 
household stabilise. Their motivation and talent do not help them to overcome the constraints they face, 
which not only confine their mobility but also the work opportunities and earnings. This might have led to 
their low participation rates in the labour force as pointed out by other studies [Afzal and Nasir (1987); 
Chaudhry and Khan (1987) and Kozel and Alderman (1990)]. 
Fig. 1. Earning Profile of Male Workers by Age and Education. 
 

















































0-9 years 10-13 years 14 + years
Fig.  3. Age-Earnings Profiles (Male vs. Females). 
 
 
Fig 4: Age-Earnings Profiles of Workers with Less than Ten Years of Schooling 




















































Fig. 5. Age-Earnings Profiles of Workers with Matric Certificate 
(Male vs. Female). 
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The wage functions estimated by the maximum likelihood method using 
probit estimates of wage participation are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for all, male 
and female workers respectively. Models with step-wise inclusion of different traits 
of workers are presented in Appendix. The wage estimates indicate that human 
capital variables explain a substantial portion of the variation in earnings. Among the 
important determinants of productivity, age (proxy for experience) and education are 
crucial. Consistent with the human capital theory, earnings in the present case are an 
increasing function of education.  A partial model that includes only human capital 
variables explains 38 percent of the variation for the complete sample, whereas such 
a model explains 39 percent for male workers and 36 percent for female workers. 
Inclusion of dummy variables for occupation and size of the firm explains an 
additional 8 percent of variation in the main regression models.10 Moreover, judged 
by the F-statistics, the overall performance of the models is also good. Since the 
dependent variable “monthly earnings” is in logs, the coefficients of independent 
variables are interpreted as percentage. 
The sample selectivity revealed by the inverse of Mill’s ratio for the complete 
sample and the sample for the male workers turned out to be statistically 
insignificant for variable LAMDA. This suggests that there is no problem of 
selection for male workers as those who opt wage sector employment do not earn 
differently from those who choose to work in the non-wage sector. In contrast to 
male workers, there is a strong evidence of selectivity among female workers. A 
negative and significant LAMDA indicates positive selection bias for females’ 
earnings in the wage sector. This implies that those who participate in the labour 
market belong to a non-random sample of the population. The endogenous nature of 
decision rule is clearly evident for women as compared to their male counterparts. 
Women who choose wage sector employment earn more than average non-wage 
sector earners. This also suggests that females who choose wage sector employment 
have above-average abilities; they are highly motivated, and are careful in their 
decision process. 
As expected, the coefficients on schooling for males and females are positive 
and statistically significant for all levels. The premiums for primary, middle, and 
secondary level are 8 percent, 15 percent, and approximately 30 percent, 
respectively, for female workers relative to the base group.11  It is noted that the 
highest returns are associated with degree education. A similar pattern is observed 
for male workers. These results are consistent with other studies, which reported 
rising trend in earnings with the levels of education involved [Ashraf and Ashraf 
(1993); Kozel and Alderman (1990); and Shabbir (1992)].  Female workers who 
10This 2R is quite high for our model because usually it is low for cross-section estimates. 
11The returns are calculated by taking the anti-log of 0.0757 (estimated coefficient of PRIM) and 
subtracting one. To convert into percentage, we multiply the value by 100. For more details, see Gujarati 
(1988), p. 149.  
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received technical training do not get any statistically significant wage benefit. 
However, males receive positive premium. The estimated coefficients of age and its 
squared term are significant at 1 percent level, with expected signs indicating 
increase in wage with age. As expected and consistent with the profiles presented 
earlier, the shapes of age-earnings profiles are concave for both male and female 
workers. These findings are in line with previous studies [Haque (1977); Hamdani 
(1977); Ashraf and Ashraf (1993)]. It is important to point out that because of the 
non-zero intercept, the results are relative to the groups not included in the model.  
 
Table 5 
Selectivity Corrected Estimates of Earnings Equations 
 Workers of Both Sexes Male Workers 
Explanatory Earnings Rates Earnings Rates 
Description Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant 5.8651*** 55.04 6.0140*** 51.09 
AGE 0.0565*** 22.15 0.0556*** 21.02 
AGESQ –0.00063*** –17.78 –0.00064*** –16.68 
PRIM 0.05829*** 2.67 0.0454** 2.01 
MID 0.1220*** 4.22 0.1105*** 3.62 
MAT 0.3023*** 6.87 0.2966*** 6.62 
DEG 0.5803*** 9.72 0.5809*** 8.91 
TT 0.0759*** 4.11 0.0748*** 3.89 
PRO 0.2857*** 12.36 0.2660*** 10.75 
MANG 0.6306*** 24.32 0.6186*** 23.30 
CLERC 0.0906*** 5.51 0.0914*** 5.38 
SALE 0.0669*** 2.56 0.0612*** 2.31 
SERV 0.0609*** 3.25 0.0771*** 3.91 
PROD 0.1484*** 8.96 0.1491*** 8.72 
BO 0.2091*** 13.26 0.1904*** 11.63 
SO 0.1252*** 7.73 0.1165*** 6.95 
UR 0.1049*** 5.77 0.1124*** 5.98 
SEX 0.1164*** 5.75 – – 










Source: Labour Force Survey 1993-94. 
                * Significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
              ** Significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
            *** Significant at 1 percent confidence level. 
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Table 6 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Probit and Earnings Equations 
 (Female Workers) 
Probit Estimates Earnings Rate Explanatory   
Description Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant –2.1981*** –6.93 5.8752*** 10.86 
AGE 0.0237 1.20 0.0674*** 6.60 
AGESQ –0.00024 –0.97 –0.00075*** –5.73 
PRIM 0.3297*** 2.22 0.0757** 2.14 
MID 08440*** 4.42 0.1431*** 2.42 
MAT 2.0029*** 17.08 0.2596** 2.22 
DEG 2.4168 14.93 0.3701*** 2.96 
TT 0.4771*** 3.71 0.0838 1.08 
PRO – – 0.4218*** 6.38 
MANG – – 0.9442*** 7.55 
CLERC – – 0.0504 0.56 
SALE – – 0.2437 1.18 
SERV – – –0.0942 –1.09 
PROD – – 0.1165** 1.98 
BO – – 0.3489*** 5.59 
SO – – 0.1259* 1.92 
UR 0.8594 9.52 –0.0530 –0.44 
MSP –0.1651** –2.35 – – 
DRATIO 0.0213 0.82 – – 







     *Significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
  **Significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
***Significant at 1 percent confidence level. 
 
The impact of different skills on earnings is estimated by the professional 
categories. Most of these categories turned out to be statistically insignificant for 
female workers and only three, i.e., managerial and administrative, professional, and 
production-related work had shown positive and significant contribution for their 
wages. The premium was the highest for managerial and administrative workers, 
followed by professional and related workers. It is important to point out that the 
majority of female workers are employed in service-related industry and a small 
percentage is working as professional and managerial workers. This low presence of 
female workers in high-paid professions reflects the difficulty for them to enter areas 
with high wages and earnings potential. But as our estimates show, those who enter 
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these professions enjoy very high returns. It is also noted that service-related 
professions, which are structurally low-paid, do not pay any premium to female 
workers as the coefficients of these variables, i.e., sales, service, and clerical 
services, turned out to be insignificant. The estimates for male workers indicate that 
the managerial and administrative responsibilities also earn them the highest wage 
premium.12 The results further suggest that the professional workers receive 
approximately 35 percent, production-related workers 16 percent, and others such as 
clerical, service, and sales workers receive premium in the range of 9 percent relative 
to the agriculture workers. These estimates are higher than those reported earlier [See 
Khan and Irfan (1985)]. Keeping in view the magnitude and statistical significance 
of professional categories, one can conclude that selection of the right profession is 
very important, besides education, to be successful in the labour market. 
Our results point out that there exists a significant wage differential in the 
formal and informal sectors, which confirms the segmented labour market 
hypothesis. The formal sector is further divided into two groups, i.e., big and small 
establishments. This division is important because out of the 33 percent labour force 
employed in the formal sector, 22 percent work in the big establishments whereas 11 
percent in the small establishments. Female employment in both formal and informal 
sectors is very limited, especially in the small formal enterprises. The estimates 
indicate that female workers receive higher compensation in the formal sector. 
Furthermore, the premium is significantly higher in big establishments as compared 
to small establishments. Male workers also receive high premium in the formal 
sector, with higher premium in the big establishments, and relatively small premium 
in small establishments. Keeping in mind the profitability and economies of scale of 
big organisations, it is not unusual if they compensate their employees more than 
small establishments of the formal as well as the informal sector establishments. 
The regional analysis suggests that female workers do not receive any extra 
wage premium for their services in urban areas.13 This is expected, because regular 
wage employment is very limited in the rural sector. On top of that, female presence 
is not only low but also confined to narrow occupations such as teaching or nursing, 
where earnings are similar to the urban sector. Male workers, on the other hand, 
receive 12 percent higher wages in the urban sector as compared to the rural sector. 
These findings are in line with other studies that found positive wage premium for 
worker in the urban areas [Khan and Irfan (1985); Ashraf and Ashraf (1993)]. The 
low earnings in the rural sector could be explained by the structure of employment in 
these areas for male workers. According to the Labour Force Survey (1993-94), 
more than 66 percent of the employed persons in the rural areas are engaged in 
agricultural or related activities. Due to the nature and structure of this sector, 
12The excluded or reference profession is agriculture. 
13The number of observations for different provinces are low for female workers. Therefore, the 
province level analysis could not be done. 
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earnings are low and uncertain. This survey reports that 53 percent of the rural 
employed persons earn up to Rs 1500 per month. It is also found that in rural areas, a 
majority (26 percent) of employees is daily wage earner. This provides a solid reason 
for lower earnings in the rural sector as compared to the urban areas. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The study is carried out to determine the factors playing an important role in 
the personal earnings of regular wage employees. Our complete sample, which 
includes both male and female workers, was not different from the workers randomly 
selected from the population. However, when it was disaggregated on gender basis, 
we found the selectivity problem for female workers. This suggested that the female 
workers in our sample had characteristics different from those who worked in the 
non-wage sector. The reported results are adjusted by the Heckman procedure for the 
bias arising from this sample selectivity. The main findings are summarised below. 
Our results suggested that the labour market was structured differently for 
male and female workers. The difference arose because of individual’s regional 
location, selection of occupation, industry association, and personal characteristics.  
Education is found to be an important determinant of the earnings for female 
as well as male workers; it enhances their productivity, and thus earnings. The 
earnings were the highest for those having a college/university education. 
The selection of profession was also an important determinant of earnings for 
both male and female workers. It was found that females classified as professional or 
managerial and administrative workers received much higher compensation as 
compared to the other professions. A statistically significant wage premium for male 
workers was found for all professional categories. 
It was observed that compensation in the formal sector was higher than in the 
informal sector. Size of the establishment in the formal sector, however, was 
important for female workers. They received significant wage premium in the big 
establishments whereas no extra premium was found in the small establishments. 
Although the earnings’ premium for male workers was higher in the big 
establishments, small establishment workers also received wage premium. The 
regional location was found to be less important for female workers. However, male 
workers received higher compensation in the urban areas as compared to the rural 
sector. These findings point out the segmentation of the labour market for primary 
and secondary jobs. 
The improvement in the economic and social conditions of low-paid groups, 
particularly female workers, require comprehensive policy formulation. Some policy 
measures are suggested below. These measures can reduce the earnings differential 
and income inequality among workers by providing them opportunities to enter the 
primary sector where earnings potential is higher. 
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To reduce the regional earnings differential, it is suggested that professions 
other than agriculture be promoted in the rural areas. Moreover, agro-based 
industries such as sugar, preservation and canning of fruits and vegetables, and 
ginning should be established in the rural areas. The cottage industry should also be 
given due importance in the rural areas. There is a dire need to develop the 
infrastructure in rural areas to attract investment. These steps will be very helpful in 
raising earnings of the rural area workers and in reducing the earnings gap. It is also 
recommended to give more incentives to labour-intensive industries so as to absorb 
unemployed youth. 
Participation of females in all occupations should also be encouraged by 
providing them with the opportunity to enhance their human capital endowment, i.e., 
education and training in different fields.  In addition to that, the informal sector 
needs to be restructured and employment opportunities for female workers should be 
increased. At present, female participation in this sector is very low because of its 
unsuitability for female employment. The restructuring of this sector by promoting 
female entrepreneureship in female-related professions can provide better prospects 
for female employment. This will not only help all female workers as a group but 
also those who are unskilled, less educated, and have inadequate resources. It is 
important to mention that the majority of the female workers are in this category. 
Other measures such as easy access to credit at low mark-up rates for female-headed 
micro-businesses and facilities to lessen the burden of their domestic labour can help 
make a substantial increase in their earnings. Moreover, the exiting policies need to 
be evaluated according to their impact on different categories of women to make 
these policies more appropriate and effective.  
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Earnings Equations 
(Complete Sample) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Variables Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant 5.8987*** 122.40 5.9313*** 117.51 5.8973*** 117.42 
AGE 0.0607*** 23.95 0.0586*** 23.87 0.0564*** 23.23 
AGESQ –0.00066*** –19.70 –0.00064*** –19.84 –0.00062*** –19.39 
PRIME 0.0818*** 4.16 0.0631*** 3.33 0.0544*** 2.90 
MID 0.1498*** 7.44 0.1383*** 7.11 0.1155*** 5.98 
MAT 0.3332*** 23.13 0.3168*** 21.76 0.2802*** 19.11 
DEG 0.7646*** 45.67 0.6612*** 37.45 0.6159*** 34.64 
TT 0.1105*** 5.75 0.0732*** 3.87 0.0691*** 3.69 
PRO – – 0.3357*** 8.02 0.2918*** 7.03 
MANG – – 0.6719*** 20.05 0.6365*** 19.14 
CLR – – 0.1308*** 5.12 0.0925*** 3.69 
SAL – – 0.0852*** 2.65 0.0701** 2.16 
SERV – – 0.0653*** 2.63 0.0388 1.62 
PROD – – 0.1839*** 7.53 0.1530*** 6.29 
BO – – – – 0.2070*** 12.90 
SO – – – – 0.1218*** 7.38 
UR 0.1543*** 12.60 0.1180*** 9.75 0.1053*** 5.15 













Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Earnings. 
       *Significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
     **Significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
  ***Significant at 1 percent confidence level. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Earnings Equations 
 (Male Workers)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant 6.0271*** 131.32 6.0319*** 124.24 5.9969*** 123,59 
AGE 0.0599*** 23.06 0.0575*** 22.87 0.0555*** 22.26 
AGESQ –0.00065*** –18.98 –0.00063*** –19.10 –0.00061*** –18.26 
PRIME 0.0650*** 3.28 0.0438*** 2.30 0.0386** 2.04 
MID 0.1336*** 6.58 0.1191*** 6.08 0.1014*** 5.21 
MAT 0.3234*** 21.86 0.3014*** 20.11 0.2732*** 18.15 
DEG 0.7557*** 43.26 0.6367*** 4.30 0.6019*** 32.30 
TT 0.188*** 5.46 0.0728*** 3.72 0.0703*** 3.62 
PRO – – 0.3848*** 9.30 0.3402*** 8.02 
MANG – – 0.7180*** 20.88 0.6794*** 19.83 
CLR – – 0.1727*** 6.70 0.1340*** 5.19 
SAL – – 0.1202*** 3.69 0.1023*** 3.10 
SERV – – 0.1193*** 4.77 0.0915*** 3.66 
PROD – – 0.2198*** 8.80 0.1892*** 7.57 
BO – – – – 0.1491*** 8.71 
SO – – – – 0.1903*** 11.62 













Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Earnings. 
    *Significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
  **Significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
***Significant at 1 percent confidence level. 
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Appendix Table 3 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Earnings Equations 
 (Female Workers) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant 5.5828*** 29.21 5.7621*** 32.34 5.7621*** 32.34 
AGE 0.0780*** 7.27 0.0684*** 7.56 0.0684*** 7.56 
AGESQ –0.00086*** –5.88 –0.00077*** –6.30 –0.00077*** –6.30 
PRIME 0.1047*** 4.04 0.0850** 2.45 0.0623** 2.45 
MID 0.1877*** 5.58 0.1694** 2.31 0.1469** 2.31 
MAT 0.2912*** 19.23 0.2729*** 2.86 0.2529*** 2.86 
DEG 0.3835*** 27.87 0.3502*** 4.78 0.3429*** 4.78 
TT 0.0925 1.15 0.0911 1.11 0.803 1.06 
PRO – – 0.4338*** 6.53 0.4213*** 6.28 
MANG – – 0.9439*** 7.75 0.9439*** 7.48 
CLERC – – 0.0614 0.64 0.0512 0.61 
SALE – – 0.2523 1.21 0.2468 1.17 
SERV – – -0.0913 –1.06 –0.0925 –1.13 
PROD – – 0.1271** 2.14 0.1098** 2.05 
BO – – – – 0.3446*** 5.48 
SO – – – – 0.1130*** 1.76 













Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Earnings. 
    *Significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
  **Significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
***Significant at 1 percent confidence level. 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Probit Equations 
Complete Sample Male Workers Explanatory 
Variables Coefficients t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant –2.2133*** –13.68 –2.3049*** –13.85 
AGE 0.0350*** 3.72 0.0532*** 5.32 
AGESQ –0.00059*** 5.36 –0.00071*** –5.92 
PRIM 0.0219*** 3.98 0.4126*** 12.10 
MID 02532*** 4.72 1.0995*** 49.75 
MAT 0.5266*** 7.92 1.6767*** 36.69 
DEG 0.6735*** 18.30 1.8597*** 34.19 
TT 0.0372*** 6.10 0.1495*** 7.05 
UR 0.0920** 1.99 0.1529*** 16.56 
MSP 0.0293** 8.61 0.0265*** 3.15 
DRATIO 0.0354 1.68 0.0461 0.92 
N 26134 24422 
Dependent Variable : WPART. 
     *Significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
  **Significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
***Significant at 1 percent confidence level. 
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